The future of software tool chain safety qualification.
Introduction
Dependable software is one of the most important factors in ensuring the safe operation of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in an increasingly technologydriven society. To ensure that embedded software behaves acceptably, a number of process standards relevant to safety have been published, e.g. IEC61508:2010 (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2010 , ISO26262 (International Organization for Standardization, 2011) and DO-178C (Special Committee 205 of RTCA, Inc., 2011) . These emphasize all or part of the engineering activities that produce safety-critical systems of a certain type, rather than only the product features of the systems themselves.
Tool usage is a common part of modern engineering activities and may have relevant safety-related implications. Guidance with regard to tools and tool integration is therefore often provided by these standards. However, both the safety-related implications of tools / tool integration and the standards are dicult to analyze, e.g. due to complexity, the number of stakeholders involved, the few sources of quantied evidence available, etc.
The question addressed in this paper is whether the guidance with regard to the integration of software tools provided by high prole systemic safety standards 2 for CPS in the transportation domain is sucient, or incomplete.
Validity is discussed in detail in Subsection 3.2, but even here in the introduction it can be noted that the diculties of studying standards are of necessity evident in the research design. Proving the success of a safety standard is dicult, since the many possible confounding factors make it hard to state that a causal relationship that holds in one context will also hold in the next. However, in cases where a causal relationship (between an end product and some part of the related engineering activities) is regarded as more or less unimportant by the relevant safety standard, there is value in identifying associated safety-related implications. This type of negative evidence namely points to an omission by the safety standard in question. The approach chosen in the study presented in this paper is therefore to investigate the causal relationships between a set of safety-related characteristics of tool chains (see Section 3.1) and software faults found during development (in-house faults) and after release (eld faults). Faults are aws or omissions that may lead to unintended or unanticipated eects in the operational system. When the guidance in the surveyed systemic safety standards is not designed to identify some of the observed faults inuenced or caused by tool usage, then clearly further discussion is required on the type and severity of this omission.
The related State of the Art is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 then considers the background, approach and validity of the study presented in this paper.
The ndings of the study are presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5.
The paper closes by summarizing the conclusions in Section 6.
State of the Art
This section presents the academic and industrial discussions related to the question addressed in this paper.
2 With systemic safety standards the author refers to standards that either a) require issues relevant to the entire life-cycle of the system under development to be taken into account, or b) are commonly deployed together with standards that ensure this.
An Academic Perspective
Several safety-critical domains, such as automotive, avionics and railways, have been frequently used as settings for research into tool integration. However, it is not the safety of the tool integration per se that has been studied.
Rather the primary focus is the importance of the development life-cycle functionality that a highly integrated support environment can supply. Examples include the RACME framework (Ceccarelli et al., 2011) and tailored tool-chain instances of the CESAR RTP (Armengaud et al., 2011) . The services of a group of carefully selected and integrated tools is also a common focus -for example, to emphasise how the combination of diverse tools can support an otherwise unlikely range of design and verication aspects (Gönczy et al., 2009 ).
The discussion regarding reference workows by Conrad et al. (2010) is one of the research eorts on tool integration that comes closest to dealing with the safety-related implications of the tool integration itself. They proposed the use of pre-qualied tools and associated workows to limit a required qualication, thereby encompassing the entire tool-chain when considering safety.
With such a weak focus on the safety-related implications of tool integration within the research eld, one can look at other elds in an eort to identify similar problems and viable approaches. Development organizations make up their own type of system, where the properties dening what is safety oriented are frequently dierent to those with importance in an operational system. Additionally, when development and operational use is discussed together it is often with regard to how the former inuences the latter. Trying to transfer ndings from operational systems to the context of development can therefore be precarious, as shown by for instance by Rollenhagen (2010) with regard to safety culture. Nevertheless, if one is careful with what is inferred, the transfer of explanatory models can at least be explored. To this eect models from the automation research eld are of interest, since software tools essentially provide the automation of human activity (in the context of this paper with regard to engineering activities).
The early, much cited report on automation by Fitts et al. (1951) may be more balanced than it is given credit for, but it does reason in terms of what humans and machines can do better than each other. Later research has instead focused on how automation commonly alters human activity rather than making it obsolete (Parasuraman et al., 2000) and that humans and machines are not interchangeable but complementary (Billings, 1997) . This broadens the common but narrow view that automation only refers to some kind of system that is acting independently. Sheridan´s often used ten degree scale starts with no automation and ends with fully independent automation (Sheridan, 1992) , but between these lowest and highest levels are steps at which the automation stops short of this -instead e.g. oering suggestions and informing the operator of actions taken. Parasuraman et al. (2000) details the understanding of automation further by applying Sheridan´s scale to dierent types of automation in a model of human-automation interaction. The dierent types include acquisition automation (automation related to the sensing and registration of input data, such as highlighting and ltering), analysis automation (automation of working memory and inferential processes, such as predictions and integration of data), decision automation (automation related to a selection from among decision alternatives) and action automation (automation related to the execution of the action choice). It is worth noting that a single system may exhibit (safety-related) aws due to too much or too little automation related to any or several of these types.
Industrial Best Practices
Hundreds of safety standards exist, making it infeasible to survey them all.
The transportation domain, which as previously mentioned has been frequently used for studying tool integration, is however a suitable limitation. The safetyrelated implications of best practices concerning separate tools in this domain have been given considerable attention (see e.g. the summary primarily focused on aviation by Kornecki and Zalewski (2009) For a full review of these commonalities (and dierences) the reader is referred to Asplund (2014) . To summarize one can identify two views on how to ensure trust in tools and tool integration. The rst approach is found in e.g. DO-178C. Trust in an end product is engendered by the constraints on its development process. In the same way, trust in a tool used during safety-critical development is ensured by its development process constraints. Tool integration is treated in a bottom-up manner, since it is considered per tool with regard to how strict tool qualication is required (assumptions about tool integration may allow or disallow tool qualication at dierent qualication levels). The second approach is found in e.g. IEC 61508:2010. Here trust is established by generic measures within the engineering environment of the targeted CPS, such as securing thorough specications and performing tool assessments. The focus is mostly on the reliability of a specic set of tools, while tool integration is even referred to in a simplistic manner as something that purely minimizes the probability of operator error. These approaches do not preclude a top-down approach on tools and tool integration. High level guidelines in both DO-178C and IEC 61508:2010 in fact underline considerations such as the consistency and complementarity of tools throughout the development life-cycle. However, neither approach provides explicit guidelines on how to ensure trust throughout a whole tool chain.
These standards go beyond a simplistic discussion of technology, employing a perspective that can be summarized as viewing automation through software tools as a team member (Pritchett (2009) provides a more detailed discussion of this type of perspective). As long as the rest of the standards are adhered to the view is that this type of automation can and should be evaluated based on its reliable execution of separate process steps independent of human operators.
Software tool automation that only supports the actions and decision-making of operators is seen as relatively inconsequential. With regard to the dierent types of automation described in the previous subsection these standards therefore seem to put the emphasis on software tools that provide high levels of action automation. Even if highly skilled and professional operators might catch problems related to low levels of acquisition and analysis automation, it seems improbable that these safety standards will provide much support in this regard.
Research Design
This section starts by presenting the background and explaining the approach of the study, then closes with a discussion of the validity and limitations of the research ndings. No particular order of priority was attributed to the characteristics at this point in time, beyond that weaknesses in support environments related to any one of them could lead to the development of unsafe end products. However, safety standards can potentially restrict the use of tools and tool chains. A particular characteristic could therefore be extensively discussed and important in theory, but irrelevant in practice (or vice versa). The signicance of the characteristics then lies in the way they summarize risk so that it can more readily be identied. Using the list of characteristics, even though it may not be complete, allows a broad search for the omissions hinted at in Subsection 2.2 in line with the approach described in the beginning of the paper.
This eort to identify omissions in standards could therefore take part in one of three tracks (separate, smaller studies) in a sequential mixed model study in two phases. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) provides a description of this type of study. Two large international companies were studied within each of the three tracks. We received access to their fault data and employees, providing that liability issues were considered by not further disclosing the company name or the magnitude of the fault numbers.
The Two Dierent Phases
The rst, quantitative phase consisted of the analysis of about 1200 software defect reports from the defect databases at the two companies. The software faults detailed by the defect reports were quantied based on the characteristics dened in the previous subsection, in order to identify:
Indicators that the characteristics had an inuence, even when no faults could be directly linked to them. The related ndings are presented in Based on the results from the analysis, a second phase was conducted to follow up on alternative explanations. This phase consisted of interviews with employees that had experience from a number of roles at each company, resulting in 7 employees at Company A and 6 employees at Company B being interviewed.
Questions were asked to provide information on undocumented faults related to tool integration, faults related to tool integration found in other projects than those sampled, and the context of the relevant faults already identied.
The Companies
Company A develops CPS in which the software has direct implications on safety, i.e. in which software failures may lead directly to physical harm. The company was chosen because it is large, continuously evaluated against systemic safety standards and has an excellent safety record. Company B is also a large, worldwide company. This company develops end products in which the software has no direct implications on safety, since mechanical safeguards protect the operator from any hazardous eects of software failures. The product studied at Company B has, like the product studied at Company A, been active for many years and is of no trivial complexity and size. Otherwise the companies operate in very dierent application domains even though they need to fulll similar high level requirements, such as adhering to strict timing demands, minimizing downtime and handling physical substances with exactness. In the track (smaller study) presented in this paper Company B was of minor importance, since the focus was on tool usage during safety-critical development. This company was therefore mainly used to support the search for alternative explanations.
However, for the sake of completeness, transparency and the requirement not to divulge the magnitude of any fault numbers, the related research data is anyway presented in its entirety in the subsequent parts of the paper.
Ensuring Validity
The subsequent three subsections discuss the validity and limitations of the dierent phases of the study.
First Phase
A number of issues had to be considered prior to the rst phase of the study to ensure the internal and external validity and the reliability of the results.
The majority of the defect reports were from two major projects, one at each company. The accessible population of defect reports from Company A´s project was limited, since it had only just passed the milestone indicating a complete design specication. This project, as well as the corresponding project at Company B, was chosen despite this, since it allowed easy access to experts directly involved in the development (thereby limiting observer bias). To limit the possibility of sampling bias, only defect reports prior to an equivalent milestone of Company B´s project were included in the rest of the study. To limit the possibility of selection bias two additional analyses were therefore performed on previously completed projects at each company. The rst involved minor projects, which conducted limited updates to the functionality of a pre-existing product. The second involved major projects and the complete set of defect reports concerning software released to customers.
Faults are directly observable and, in those cases when weaknesses of support environments are related to the characteristics and have been found to cause faults, the internal validity is primarily established through precautions with regard to observer bias. The same is true for mislabeled defect reports dealing with other considerations, such as feature requests, which could easily by excluded from the study. With regard to the indicators, the question is more complex due to the choice to minimize observer bias, since it limited the accessible fault population to only those from a part of the major projects. Here the reasoning is therefore further supported through the extended analysis of historical projects.
Two problems related to the external validity is especially pertinent in this study. Firstly, considering that we are looking for evidence of a casual relationship that is not considered by safety standards, are the involved companies special in any way that might lead to such a causal relationship even though it is otherwise improbable? The choice of the companies is decisive with regard to this problem. Neither of the companies employ technology that cannot be expected to be found at other companies of similar resources, with the State of the Art being far ahead. If any of the characteristics exert an inuence at these companies, they can be expected to be able to do so at other best practices companies. However, the study focuses on software faults within CPS. The ndings are therefore not automatically transferable to engineering disciplines other than software engineering or to systems other than CPS. Secondly, the safety standards surveyed in Subsection 2.2 are all within the transportation domain. Even though these standards spend much eort on the subject of tool qualication, there might be other domains with safety standards that lack the identied omissions. The discussion and conclusions have been suitably limited to take both of these problems into account.
The threat to reliability in this phase is also likely to be related to observer bias, i.e. that other observers would evaluate the data dierently. To avoid this bias, dierent employees at the two companies were asked to review and provide their views on all ambiguous observations. This essentially happened every week of the study, especially in regard to judging the criticality and eect of a fault.
Second Phase
The second phase was also planned to ensure the validity of the results, but the choice of the interview method required dierent considerations (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009 ). Firstly, a eld journal was used e.g. to document questions. Secondly, the choice of interviewees was based on the intent to cover the perspectives of as large a part as possible of the development organization.
The developer, project manager, manager, tester, designer and support environment customizer roles were covered at both companies. Thirdly, the ethical considerations discussed prior to the study included potential reasons why interviewees might provide biased or incorrect information. To avoid this, the interview transcripts were approved by the interviewees after completion and a more confrontational interviewing technique adopted. Fourthly, to avoid the risk of interviewer bias, secondary interviewers were present during early interviews.
Interphase Considerations
The choice of research design was mainly based on the intent to increase the quality of inferences. According to e.g. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) the possibility that alternative explanations exist is decreased by use of a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods.
Research Findings
The research ndings of the study are presented in two subsections, respectively addressing the two categorisations described in Subsection 3.1.1. As mentioned in Section 3, concerns regarding legal liability prohibits the magnitude of fault data to be divulged. The research data is therefore provided in percentages. The discussion found in the subsequent sections takes this into account. Positive inuence has been identied by nding a characteristic mentioned in a defect report part describing how a fault was found.
The distributions from the three dierent populations at each company show little similarity. Due to the low number of indicators in late iterations and software released to customers, it is only possible to perform a chi square goodness of t test when comparing the main project and the late iteration from Company A 3 . This test, however, allows one to conclude that the inuence of the characteristics varies across the development life-cycle, since the early parts of the main project cannot be used to predict the distribution of indicators in the 3 The problems in performing statistical tests were not unexpected. If one considers the previously completed project at Company A from where faults were sampled, the eld faults make up only 1% of the total faults and the faults from the large, late iteration less than 5%. The interviews uncovered references to faults in other projects which also indicated an inuence by the characteristics. Additionally, when questioned about problems related to tools and tool integration, the interviewees could often provide examples. Almost all interviewees had experienced problems when trying to understand GUI's (all 7 employees at Company A and 4 out of 6 at Company B). Most of the interviewees had experienced problems with extracting or viewing data from the development process (6 and 3 interviewees, respectively).
A substantial part of the interviewees had also encountered reliability issues (4 and 1 interviewees, respectively) or the incorrect handling of notications (3 and 1 interviewees, respectively). However, none of the interviewees could provide an example of when their encounters with such problems had resulted in a fault in the end product (although some gave examples of when this had happened to other employees). At most, these problems had resulted in an extra work eort by the interviewees to correct temporarily erroneous artifacts. Most of these problems were also related to tools, with only a few examples involving tool integration. In fact, while all interviewees considered tools an essential part of their work environment, only half of them considered any tool integration important. The rest of the interviewees considered tool integration either unimportant or something that provided some helpful but not critical support.
Faults Caused by Weaknesses in Support Environments
The number of faults of which weaknesses in a support environment related to the characteristics are described as the cause make up 1% of the surveyed faults (versus 11% showing an indication of the characteristics). Their distribution is shown in Figures 3 and 4 .
All of these characteristics were related to several weaknesses that had caused faults:
Traceability for Completeness and Consistency. Firstly, when there was a lack of links between requirements belonging to dierent abstraction levels, the resulting confusion could lead to mistakes. Secondly, when temporary links to dummy requirements were not updated, completeness could be falsely assumed. Process Control/Notications. Firstly, when some artifacts were changed without relevant stakeholders being notied, the result could be asynchronous evolution of development artifacts. Secondly, when weaknesses in the code were identied during reviews, the complete set of weaknesses was sometimes not acted on.
The interviews uncovered references to faults in other projects with similar causes, but also: Customized GUI's. When comparing the dierences between dierent versions of code prior to a release, the sheer number of changes could make their impact dicult to assess. One mentioned result was the erroneous update of a system conguration that led to the removal of a critical part of a user interface. Data Integrity. When distributed building of code erroneously used different compiler versions, this sometimes led to incompatible binaries.
Of the characteristics-related faults, only those related to the Customized GUI's characteristic and the rst type of the Process Control/Notications characteristic were safety-critical. The former was also a eld fault.
Discussion
The following three subsections discuss and elaborate on the research ndings presented in the previous section. The rst subsection summarizes the most important observations of the study and how these relate to the two categorisations described in Subsection 3.1.1. The second subsection, based on the literature on support environments for CPS, presents the likely future development of support environments in areas related to the most important observations. The third subsection builds upon the rst two to discuss whether modern safety standards contain omissions that will have an increasing possibility of negatively inuencing the safety of end products if support environments become more and more automated.
What is observed?
An important observation is that weaknesses in support environments related to the characteristics could lead to software faults through a too high level of action automation, in the form of erroneous or incomplete Automated Tool Usage. Automation has independently caused and failed to identify faults, which gives credence to the team member perspective on automation put forth by the safety standards surveyed in Subsection 2.2.
A development organization itself also makes this perspective natural. All interviewees acknowledged that they could not perform their work without the support of modern software tools. At the same time most of them had experienced frequent problems with the reliability of and interaction with these tools, but without these problems leading to any apparent adverse eects (save some extra eort to make things right). Due to the essential nature of the tools, the interviewees had tried to adapt to make up for any weaknesses in them.
The only unacceptable weakness would thus be tools introducing faults in ways that interviewees could not compensate for -in other words, if tools introduced faults through automation outside the control of the operator. This acceptance of weaknesses may also be the reason why tool integration was deemed unimportant by so many interviewees. As long as data was shued around between tools in a reliable way, the interviewees thought they could deal with any shortcomings of the tool integration on their own. However, in the cases when tool integration inuenced the end product negatively during safety-critical development, it was more often in an indirect rather than a direct fashion. Firstly, traceability was identied both as the primary positive and the primary negative inuence at Company A. Secondly, the only identied safety-critical eld fault caused by a weakness in a support environment related to a characteristic was introduced through a GUI not being suitable for a particular task during development. One may also note that, regardless of the strong focus on information management stipulated by system engineering, safety-critical faults were also introduced through the lack of well designed notications and process control.
Another important observation is thus that weaknesses related to the characteristics could lead to software faults through a too low level of acquisition and analysis automation, which this study shows for lack of appropriate Customized GUI's and missing Process Control/Notications, and makes likely for manually implemented Traceability for Completeness and Consistency. 5.2. What can be expected?
It is then natural to ask oneself how likely this is to be important in the future of safety-critical CPS development.
With regard to the implications of a too high level of action automation, more fully independent automation in safety-critical development is to be expected in the future. Automated verication in particular has been increasingly used in safety-critical development (Broy et al., 2010) . However, systemic safety standards seem to identify and address this potential problem.
Automation of tools and tool integration at the low end of Sheridan´s scale, which supports the human operator instead of replacing him, is also likely to increase. As an example, both simulation (Benveniste et al., 2005; Kang et al., 2013) and analysis (Broy et al., 2010; Lahtinen et al., 2012) are already used extensively in safety-critical development. The associated tools and tool integration will most likely evolve further during the next decade together with support to mitigate many other important issues at a low level of automation (such as ltering of changes and notications to avoid information overow (Törngren et al., 2008) ). By failing to address these potential problems, some systemic safety standards allow for overcondence in low levels of automation.
What needs to be done?
Tool integration aimed at supporting operators through acquisition and analysis automation will become critical to ensure that engineers keep making the right choices with regard to an increasing number of complex system-wide properties. This is not a question of replacing process steps in future safety-critical development, but rather one of supporting the reasoning of the individual operators. Building from a bottom-up, team member perspective, the surveyed systemic safety standards have little in the way of guidelines for establishing trust at these low levels of automation.
When even obviously awed tools and tool integration can be accepted as long as the operator thinks he can ordinarily compensate for these aws, and with low levels of automation leading to safety-critical eld faults, there is a need for further guidance by the surveyed systemic safety standards. Other safety standards that do not already provide this guidance or regulate a safetycritical domain in which these concerns can be proven to be minimal are also in need of change. This paper proposes the introduction of software tool chain qualication to ensure that erroneously designed (or incomplete) acquisition and analysis automation does not lead operators astray.
With operators acting on the complete tool chain to establish an understanding of the current state of development, such software tool chain qualication must be focused at a higher level of organization than that of individual software tools. This calls for each task in which software tools are used within development to be evaluated according to the following criteria:
The possibility that the combination of all software support for a task is unsuitable for bringing faults or omissions in the safety-critical system being developed to the attention of operators during development.
The condence in preventing or detecting such faults or omissions.
Considering that standards are a compilation of best practices, the introduction of such tool chain qualication guidelines is probably still some years ahead. In the meantime this omission may act as a guide for safety-related research within the tool integration research eld. One should in that case keep in mind that tool integration is a research eld that could benet from theory triangulation to foster the use of a more diverse set of research methods (Asplund, 2014) .
Research elds closely related to tool integration oer some possibilities in this regard, since the identied problems could be related to such things as human-machine interaction and process management. However, a more distant research eld could potentially be more fruitful with regard to theory triangulation. Given that the identied omission concerns low levels of automation, it is the author´s suggestion that organizational research should be approached, especially in relation to safety culture. The term gures in industry and there often implies -as exemplied in the description given in ISO 26262 -that processes for continuous improvement need to be in place. If the safety-related implications of tools and tool integration increase as support environments become more automated, these processes should have direct bearing on the outcome with regard to risk. Due to the distance between the research elds there are, however, diculties that must be overcome to make this a reality. The theoretical implications of the term safety culture for instance is diverse, since it is a term with many dierent denitions in many dierent contexts, as noted by e.g. Guldenmund (2000) . Edwards et al. (2013) describe three types of conceptualisations of the term: normative, anthropological and pragmatist. Which of these is most easy (or even possible) to adopt during theory triangulation with tool integration is an open question. Furthermore, improper tool integration may lead to risks, but the associated faults may only rarely lead to accidents and may not always be the triggering factor even when they could be. Proving causal relationships may be dicult when it is not straight-forward as to which type of rule-breaking, attitudes or behaviour leads to risk.
Conclusions
The study presented in this paper, focusing on the best practices in CPS software development, identies a negative, indirect inuence from -as well as faults caused by -both too high and too low levels of automation in support environments.
The transportation domain is a high prole CPS domain that has frequently been used for studying tool integration and the safety-related implications of best practices concerning separate tools. Nevertheless, modern high prole safety standards in this domain advocate essentially bottom-up approaches for tool qualication. These approaches do not handle tool usage problems at low levels of automation when operators depend on tool integration to give critical support in assessing development processes or artifacts.
The leaps in technology expected to occur in the near future, due to demands for increased eciency and cost reduction, are likely to lead to an increased dependency on tools and tool integration providing a low level automation. The next generation of standards for safety-critical development of CPS that do not provide guidance beyond the high prole safety standards of the transportation domain therefore need to change. They should include guidelines for a topdown software tool chain qualication process that starts with tasks rather than technology. Otherwise the introduction of modern support environments runs the risk of pushing operators towards erroneous or incomplete decision making.
Given the type of omission it is suggested that researchers focusing on the safety-related implications of tool integration approach organizational research in search of possibilities to set up theory triangulation studies.
